disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory
Volume 24 Market Failures, Famines, & Crises

Article 4

5-5-2015

Challenging Dominant Market Theories in Five Ways
Thomas E. Janoski
University of Kentucky

DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/disclosure.24.04

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License.

Recommended Citation
Janoski, Thomas E. (2015) "Challenging Dominant Market Theories in Five Ways," disClosure: A Journal of
Social Theory: Vol. 24, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/disclosure.24.04
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure/vol24/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory. Questions about
the journal can be sent to disclosurejournal@gmail.com

Challenging Dominant Market Theories in Five Ways
Cover Page Footnote
The author thanks the participants of “The Market Failures, Famines and Crisises” Seminar sponsored by
the Committee on Social Theory in the Spring of 2014, especially the other three faculty participants –
David Freshwater from Agricultural Economics, David Hamilton from History, and Arnold Farr from
Philosophy. He also thanks the other participants especially Grace Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll, and Greta
Krippner of the University of Michigan for her visit to the class to explain her economic sociological
theories of market failure.

This article is available in disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure/vol24/
iss1/4

Challenging Dominant Market Theories in Five Ways 1
THOMAS E. JANOSKI
University of Kentucky
Introduction
In the halls of American policy making, neo-classical economists have long had
the politician’s ear, and this has intensified with the rise of neo-liberalism as a
political movement. Marion Fourcade and colleagues even title a recent paper
“The Superiority of Economists”.2 And neo-liberalism seeks to replace many state
functions with free market solutions such as privatizing the post office and
chartering the public schools. Economists’ arguments about markets vary in three
ways: (a) positive claims that free markets are more efficient and rational, (b)
normative claims that free markets should be more rational or efficient but fail to
be so due to interest groups and politics, or irrational consumers or producers, and
(c) interference claims that the state prevents free markets.3 The public tends to
accept these arguments in boom times, but in crisis these arguments of perfect
markets (or imperfect markets but it is the best that we can do) have encountered
a crescendo of criticism. Scholars in anthropology, sociology, geography and
even parts of psychology have argued against the efficiency, rationality and
uncritical use of market theory. This paper will consider five such arguments
against the exaggerations and misconceptions of free markets, while still
maintaining that markets can be useful if they are regulated and/or altered in a
number of ways. These challenges are not so much normative arguments that
markets should behave in different ways. Rather they are arguments that markets
actually do operate in a variety of ways and that we should recognize the reality
of markets (i.e., their good and bad sides) and then more accurately attempt to
alter or control that reality.
This article will first review why many social scientists are dissatisfied
The author thanks the participants of the “Market Failures, Famines and Crisises” Seminar
sponsored by the Committee on Social Theory in the Spring of 2014, especially the other three
faculty participants – David Freshwater from Agricultural Economics, David Hamilton from
History, and Arnold Farr from Philosophy. He also thanks the other participants especially Grace
Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll, and Greta Krippner of the University of Michigan for her visit to
the class to explain her economic sociological theories of market failure.
2
Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan, "The Superiority of Economists," Maxpo
Discussion Paper 14, no. 3 (2014).
3
While there are institutional and Marxist economists, my reference to economists reflects the
mainstream and dominant view of neo-classical economics in the US.
Milton Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Mariner Books, 1990).
Friedrich August Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents: The Definitive Edition (New
York: Routledge, 2014).
1
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with an overreliance on markets, and a conceptualization of markets being
efficient, fair and rational. This will focus especially on marginal utility – the
dominant economic mechanism when it comes to explaining efficient and rational
markets. The challenge to markets is then widened in a number of ways to include
crucial explanations as to why and how markets get constructed, especially their
mechanisms. It presents five types of arguments critical of markets: (1) the
Marxian approach to markets and then later in the paper, their view of crises
along with the Hyman Minsky approach of increasing cyclical pressure to take
risks, (2) the rise of Karl Polanyi’s view that markets are fragile and that they
need to be embedded in society and the state; (3) a coalition of organizational
scholars including Neil Fligstein see organizations of various types as creating a
‘conception of control’ whereby the market is shaped by their elite interests; (4) a
more complex decision-making approach starting with Max Weber’s view of
social action being based on rationalities, traditions and emotions, which is then
combined with Edward Fischer’s cultural approach to prices, quality, and the
environment; and (5) a macro-application of social exchange theory to bargaining
power in the market. But one caveat must be stated at the beginning. This paper
does not provide evidence on the workability of these five approaches, but rather
sets the scope and range of each of these market critiques. In essence, each theory
questions either rationality or efficiency, and a number of the theories question
the outright goals of economic market theories in terms of fairness and economic
growth.
Dissatisfaction with an Overemphasis of the Virtues of Markets:
Neo-classical economics developed primarily out of the micro-economic
marginalist school developed by Alfred Marshall (1979), Léon Walras (1984),
Vilfredo Pareto (1906), Arthur Pigou (1920), and Carl Menger (1950) around the
turn of the 19th into the 20th century.4 Marginal utility becomes the driving force
of investment and wages as owners pay wages only in proportion to the utility that
is added to their production, and investment is only made when marginal utility is
of a high order. Marginalist economics is highly amenable to mathematical
specification and it propelled economics as a field into micro- or firm-level focus
on supply and demand. The moral philosophy approach of Adam Smith is
somewhat of an embarrassment to these marginalists.5 Smith only used ‘the
4

Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: MacMillan Press, 2004).
Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics. 4th ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Orion Editions, 1984).
Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1927).
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Palgrave Macmillan, 1920).
Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, 1950.
5
Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2005).
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invisible hand’ metaphor twice in The Wealth of Nations,6 and proposed more of
a symbolic interactionist view with empathy and concern for others as how
markets and firms are tamed in the economic field.7 Smith even contradicts the
theory of comparative advantage with ‘absolute advantage.’ But marginalist
economics takes the little-used metaphor of the invisible hand and drops much of
the rest of Smith. Marginalism was so successful that it made macro-economics
passé. Keynesian economics in the 1930s was a reinvigoration of macroeconomics, and it largely opposed to the marginalists’ overlooking phenomena at
the institutional, nation-state and even global level.8 But market rationality and
efficiency largely rest on the principles developed by accentuating the importance
of firms and consumers following the dictates of rationality in pursuit of
“marginal utility.”
There are three main issues that social scientists contest about a
neoclassical view of markets: inequality, instability, and residualization or
overreach.9 First, many social scientists view the market as causing inequality and
that it requires major efforts to make the economy and society anywhere near
being legitimate or just. This is a major position of citizenship theory from T. H.
Marshall to Bryan Turner.10 The market makes inequality and the social welfare
state mitigates this by creating or restoring equality.11 The market and citizenship,
especially social rights and the welfare state, are almost in a dialectical
relationship in maintaining somewhat of a socially just society. It’s almost a yin
and yang of destructive inequality and restorative equality. When encountering
fairness and inequality, the marginalists have a soft and a hard answer. The soft
argument sees fairness as coming in terms of everyone getting their best bargain
in the market, and that the market then equilibrates to satisfy everyone’s’ needs.
This theory peaked in the 1990s up until 2008 in the form of the efficient market
hypothesis. While there were strong and weak forms of this theory, its strong
version stated that financial markets reflect a vast amount of public and even
insider data, and thus, markets accurately reflect the equilibrium prices of firm
6

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin
Cannan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1776), 744.
7
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Penguin, 2010).
8
For an extended critique, see: Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy,
2005.
9
Tony Lawson in Reorienting Economics (2003:3) sees these weaknesses as: (1) domination by a
mathematical-deductivist modeling that ignores empirical reality, (2) a mainstream project that is
in disarray, (3) models being applied to a reality that does not conform, and (4) an approach that
keeps economics from realizing its potential. These points, of course, can be debated.
10
Thomas H. Marshall, "Class, Citizenship and Social Development" (1964).
Bryan Turner, Bryan, Citizenship and Capitalism (London: Allen-Unwin, 1986).
11
Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in
Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
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stock and to a certain degree the strategies that they are following. Eugene Fama
(1965, 1970) was most associated with this theory and received a Nobel Prize for
his theory.12 However, this concept of fairness does not do well in the face of
poverty and underdevelopment, and it looked especially bad in the aftermath of
the 2008 Great Recession. The hard argument indicates that human beings own
property and they profit from their expert and skillful use of that property. If
others do not have the skills or industriousness of the wealthy, then it is their own
fault. This answer is not satisfactory to critics, but it has the merit of being more
in accord with empirical results (i.e., it does not pretend to be equitable). In effect,
this comes down to equality of opportunity without regard to the results.
Second, the economics term ‘externality’ describes a great deal of what
other social sciences disciplines (anthropology, geography, sociology and political
science) are about. Theorists often refer to this as a “residual category” or a large
amount social action that a theory claims no expertise over. Obviously, these
other social sciences view this residualization of society as a huge gap in
economic theories, especially when those theories are claimed to hold the key to
how life and government should be conducted. Third, markets are prone to cycles,
shocks, recessions and depressions. If the market is so efficient, why do these
types of events occur? But markets are often not efficient and lead to large
amounts of waste both human and environmental. Economists often refer to these
issues as ‘adjustments,’ but they are often quite devastating to society. I will have
more to say on this later.
One distraction should be mentioned concerning economic debates. In the
1930s, John Maynard Keynes developed what became known as Keynesian
economics in The General Theory of Employment and Money.13 In economic
discourse over the last 80 years, economists have had intensely divisive debates
over Keynesian versus monetary economic solutions most often embodied by
Milton Friedman and now, the neo-liberals and supply-side economists.14 Keynes
said that the government should intervene in the economy with strong countercyclical spending patterns in order to avert a recession or depression, and he is
most currently represented by Paul Krugman.15 Many economists credit US,
12

Oddly enough, Fama’s Nobel Prize came in 2013 after his theories suffered from harsh criticism
from the 2008 Great Recession.
Eugene Fama, "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," Journal of Business 38 (1965): 34-105.
——— "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance
25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
13
John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London:
Prometheus Books, 1936).
14
Milton Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Mariner Books, 1990).
15
John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London:
Prometheus Books, 1936).
Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2012).
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German and Swedish counter-cyclical spending during the depression as a major
force to end that crisis. However, Keynes is more or less implying that the
government is not otherwise heavily implicated in the market and economics as a
whole. Keynesian economics is not exactly a critique of markets, but rather an
economic fix to repair markets when they are in trouble. It is important not to get
side-tracked by the sturm und drang of the economists’ intense debate. In other
words, Keynes is more of a corrective rather than a direct critique of markets even
though government intervention does parallel some critiques. But those more
critical positions go further to say that the government is there through thick and
thin, not just as a tool of intervention. In other words, the government being there
is not just to suddenly increase spending, but to also set the ground rules of
markets functioning at all (not unlike Marx’s social relations of production).
There are many other dissatisfactions concerning the more specific aspects
of neo-classical views of markets, but these three issues – inequality, externalities
and crises – are the major problems that social scientists see. The next sections
represent various social scientific challenges to markets, and their specific
dissatisfactions with markets.
Unfair Exchange and the Labor Theory of Value
Karl Marx was generally anti-market in the sense that he theorized that values in
markets represented both exchange value and use-value. Markets were highly
problematic since they relied on exchange values that were determined in ways
that benefitted the owner classes at the expense of the working class. The working
classes would prefer to have their needs met by products and food based on “usevalue,” but the capitalist system would not provide prices for goods and food at
this level. Instead they relied on “exchange values” that are determined by the
demand and supply.16 As such, the system was unjust and embodies much
exploitation. His market-based solution (as opposed to his political solution of
revolution) relied on the labor theory of value to switch the tables on the owners
of capital to say that their extraction of surplus value should not be allowed
because it should be justly distributed to the workers themselves. In fact, the labor
theory of value states that all value is produced by labor and thus belongs to labor.
This revamping or destruction of markets would be ruled by the principle of
“from each according to their ability to each according to their need.” This
solution largely calls for the destruction or withering away of markets. I will
return to Marx later in this paper on the topic of crises. The next challenges to
Marx’s concepts of use value and exchange value (1992) parallel Adam Smith’s concepts of
natural and market prices (1976, chapter 4). It is useful to note that both Adam Smith and David
Ricardo espoused a labor theory of value, but unlike Marx they included managers and owners in
their concept of labor.
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markets focus on keeping markets, but controlling their harsh logics of
exploitation.
Embeddedness and the Fragility of Free Markets
Karl Polanyi developed a theory of markets in the mid-1940s based on his
historical examination of markets in Britain during the industrial revolution and
beyond. He is referred to in a variety of ways as an economic historian, economic
anthropologist, political economist, historical sociologist and social philosopher.
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argues that “there is nothing natural about
laissez-faire”,17 and that free markets only existed in Britain for a very short
period of time (roughly 1852 to 1873 after the repeal of the Corn Laws went into
effect). However, when totally free markets held sway, they proved to be so
disruptive and unworkable that the British economy needed to be substantially
controlled by the state and sometimes civil society. Societies need the economy to
be embedded into society and culture through various types of changes in social
mores, institutional structures, and state regulation. After this was done, the
British state stabilized the economy’s unfettered markets, and despite crises of
financial panics, recessions and depressions, generally moved in a more and more
prosperous direction. But Polanyi did not recommend this roly-poly and often
exploitative survival mechanism. He was often seen as providing a foundation for
an economic democracy movement that have particular resonance in the Social
Democratic Party in Germany and various social movements.
Polanyi is now seen as one of the major theorists of the economy being
‘embedded’ in society and the institutional structuring of markets and society in
general. His approach has largely led to the rise of economic sociology and
anthropology that emphasizes alternatives to free markets. Polanyi went on to
apply these principles to ancient economies such as Pre-Columbian America and
ancient Mesopotamia, although its utility to the study of ancient societies in
general has been questioned. He goes back to Greek philosophy of Aristotle to
make the distinction between chrematistics and oikonomia. Chrematistics is the
production of goods or services for the purposes of creating wealth to enhance
one’s own status and power in society. Oikonomia is producing goods and
services to create wealth that serves the needs of society and distributive justice.
This parallels Marx’s concepts of exchange and use value.18 It is odd that modern
day economics and Wall Street looks to chrematistics more than Oikonomia.19 He
then indicates that no action is purely economic since it is a Lebensweg (way of
17

Karl Polanyi and Harry W. Pearson. Livelihood of Man (Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 1977),
139.
18
Karl Marx, "Capital, Volume III" (Harmondsworth: Penguin/New Left Review, 1992).
19
Matthew Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2005), 28-29.
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life) whereby humans lead a morally-guided way of life. Hence, “no action can be
purely economic”.20 And when they are treated as such, we have reached an
artificiality of economistic reification.
Polanyi’s theories eventually became the foundation for anthropological,
political and sociological schools looking at controls for the market and the
economic democracy movement. I have not covered his mechanisms of exchange
in this section, but will return to Polanyi in the section on decision-making below.
An organization furthering his views exists at McGill University in Montreal.
Fred Block and Margaret Somers, and Richard Swedberg are scholars now
working in this tradition.21 A version of this embeddedness approach is taken by
social network analysis, which shows how specific connections between people
and organizations combine to make different types of decisions in markets. In a
sense, the invisible hand is a fiction as these kinds of economic decisions are
made through social networks of decision-makers in highly embedded institutions
that cannot operate with a sense of automaticity. These social network approaches
can be seen with the work of Harrison White, Ronald Burt, Mark Granovetter, and
many others.22
Organizational Conceptions of Control of Markets
Economic sociologists and geographers have frequently insisted that markets are
controlled by firms and elites, which also have strong influence on the state.
These firms and elites represent market lumpiness with a bounded organization
that can protect segments of managers and employees from supply and demand.
In Neil Fligstein’s approach to markets has developed in an institutional way
somewhat similar to Polanyi but more specifically focused on what corporations
do and how corporations can persuade governments and ultimately societies to
view market mechanisms. This presents firm action in coalitions in a more active
and instrumental way than typically endorsed by market theorists. In The
20

Ibid.
Karl Polanyi and Harry W. Pearson, Livelihood of Man, 1977.
21
Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism (Boston, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2014).
Richard Swedberg, Principles of Economic Sociology, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007).
22
Harrison White, Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2002).
Roland Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Boston, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
Mark Granovetter, "Business Groups," The Handbook of Economic Sociology, eds. Neil Smelser
and Richard Swedberg. (New York: Russell Sage, 1994).
——— "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American
Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481-510.
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Architecture of Markets and other works, Fligstein examines how corporations
view market strategies in order to increase their power or survive in fluctuating
circumstances. Fligstein and McAdams recent book extends this approach to
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of fields.23
One focus of his approach is to look at how stakeholder value theories had
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s with a focus on all of the people affected by
corporations deserved a hearing in how corporate power was used. For instance,
customers, workers, shareholders, communities, governments, and the public in
general, and other constituencies have a ‘stake’ in corporate actions. Fligstein is
not presenting a normative view that stakeholder value theory was correct, but
rather looks at how corporations and capitalists renegotiated their “conception of
control” of how the market would operate.
Much of this renegotiation occurred during the oil crisis when Jimmy
Carter was US president in the late 1970s, and corporate profits had gone into a
nose dive due to the oil crises and youth rebellion, but even more threatening was
the Nixon and Carter discussions of wage and price controls during highly
inflationary times. Since the corporations still had considerable power, the
negotiation was rather implicit until the final product later presented itself to these
various groups. The solution aided by principal-agent theory in economics saw
these larger social movements as a “stake” in the heart of capitalism, so they
created a new theory based on a more focused agenda. Corporations and their
CEOs were agents of stockholders and they needed to be doing what shareholders
wanted – make large profits.
As a result, corporations changed their focus to “shareholder value theory”
with considerable outsourcing and then off-shoring. They focused on keeping
their nose to the grindstone of higher profits, increasing the price of their stock on
Wall Street, and paying dividends to stockholders. This approach rewarded CEOs
with higher wages and stock options in order to align CEO decisions with
shareholder’s interests in their economic returns. The side effect of this was to
increase corporate salaries to astronomical levels and largely decrease worker
wages through outsourcing. The logic of outsourcing was to have work done by
corporations with subcontractors who would not share in the good fortune of
corporate profits. The overall theory based on this shift from stakeholder
approaches to shareholder value theory is that firms socially construct the shape
and functioning of markets through this conception of control. These conceptions
may change over time and need to be examined by scholars. One underrecognized aspect of stockholder value theory is that atomistic markets making
decisions on their own do not really exist. Instead, large and bulky players, such
as corporations and stock market exchanges shape and control markets. Compared
23

Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, A Theory of Fields (New York: Oxford University Press,
2014).
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to Polanyi who focused more on state institutions, Fligstein is adding an elite
control theory into the mix negotiated by private firms and investment bankers.
Actual Mechanisms of Markets: Sociological and Anthropological Views
Embeddedness is a more contextual theory with little presence of a mechanism,
and the conception of control provides some aspects of mechanism but not one
that really talks about how markets actually work on a daily basis. A fourth
approach combines a sociological view of decision-making using Max Weber’s
theory of social action with its counterbalancing influence of culture, with a more
specific anthropological view based on complex forms of exchange relying on the
economist Amartya Sen and anthropologist Edward Fisher’s approach to prices,
quality, and the environment. The following discussion will take Weber first, and
then go to Sen and Fischer.
Max Weber accepted much of the political economy approach of Karl
Marx in terms of class but largely rejected his view of markets.24 His later work
focused much more on the culture of the rise of capitalism with the Protestant
Ethic. If we only relied on the cultural argument, we would be simply adding to
Polanyi’s approach. But what is of more interest is his general theory of social
action. Weber viewed social action as being based on four types of rationality,
tradition and emotion. Weber interrogates rationality to find procedural, practical,
theoretical and substantive rationalities. Herbert Simon as a neo-Weberian
considerably softened rationality with satisficing under conditions of limited
decision-making powers. Weber’s practical rationality was the application of
these principles to the level of practical life where Simon’s more limited searches
may apply. But in a different way, Weber also presented theoretical and
substantive rationality. For instance, Pope Francis largely follows the theoretical
rationality of the Catholic Church’s principles about the economy in caring for the
poor and not producing so many poor people in the first place. This is based on a
certain element of sharing and to some degree caring for a community. There are
many elements to the theory of Catholicism, but those having to do with
economic equality are more important than profit maximization. There are many
other secular forms of theoretical rationality involved with political party
ideologies, environmental movements, and cosmopolitan value theories. Social
democratic parties do not follow market maximization principles and have a
social market theory that embraces caring for the less fortunate in society. And
substantive rationality may have less of a grand theory, but it is more or less the
theory of fitting into the culture of your community in whatever way you might
conceive of it.
24

Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New ed. 2 vols.
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).

Challenging Dominant Market Theories 52

Culture makes its more direct entry into decision-making with “tradition”
as a basis of social action. People do things the way they have done them in the
past. To neo-classical economists, this makes people economic dopes because
they are being irrational. But building on Herbert Simon’s theory of decisionmaking overload, we cannot spend time everyday evaluating the procedural
rationality of every action we take (e.g., is brushing your teeth rational and if it is
should you brush five times a day to prevent tooth decay). We all largely live in
fairly large entities called societies (admittedly the boundaries and belonging may
be contested) that give us designs for living that we do not need to contest every
day with maximizing logic. Many of these actions involve emotion, and families
and communities involve a certain amount of love and caring. And interactions
within and without may also involve hate and mistrust, but these emotions also
bind us to traditions of various sorts of culture. But most cultures are constructed
to create a certain amount of well-being for their members. Economists largely
ignore religions that largely promote the well-being of their members and more
secular or even cosmopolitan concerns for the well-being for outsiders.
Within economics, there are infrequent mentions of emotions with Keynes
concept of “animal spirits.” Though neoclassical economics have not taken up the
concept of emotions and the field of economics in general avoids it, George
Akerlof and Robert Schiller refer to animal spirits as the “noneconomic and
irrational” aspects of social life that propel markets.25 These two Nobel Prize
winners present five types of animal spirits or emotional aspects of economic
action. The first is confidence by investors or consumers that provide the ups and
downs of markets. Confidence can be very unstable and unpredictable, and it is
prone to the “irrational exuberance” of a rising bull market to the almost
“paranoid gloom” of bear market crashes.26 Rather than listening to economics,
market commentators and prognosticators ride on the emotional confidence of
investors in supporting a rising market or consumer confidence causing a rise in
sales and a resulting surge in stock prices. A second type of animal spirit is
fairness, which is mostly dominated by efficiency in the economics literature. But
when the economist Albert Rees was dealing with administrative problems in his
many different posts, he had to deal with “fairness” conceptions and beliefs of
many groups.27 And labor (not to mention sociology, anthropology, psychology,
and geography) in general constantly brings up fairness as a major concern that
negotiating groups have concerning wages and working conditions.
A third aspect of animal spirits concerns corruption, immorality, or
25

George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2010),
xxiv.
26
Robert J. Schiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
27
George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits, 2010.
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cheating in general. Akerlof and Schiller28 point to the many manipulations that
market investors and firms may engage in ranging from outright scams of many
Ponzi schemes that never really intend to be money making ventures to the actual
murder and thuggery of gangster capitalism present in the new markets in Russia
and elsewhere. Neoclassical economists sometimes view this as opportunism, but
much of it slides from the grey areas of legal interpretations into blatant robbery,
murder and “offers one cannot refuse.” And an opposite force sometimes comes
to meet this is immorality with religion sometimes backed up by laws to the
extent that they can be seen as legitimate and enforceable. A fourth type of
animal spirits is “money illusion” which is more of a cognitive issue. This is
when decisions over time are affected by nominal money values rather than the
real wages or costs of goods and services.29 One can see this in long-term
contracts that focus on current rates and ignore longer term costs over time. All
contracts should have cost-of-living adjustments and we should live in a world of
adjustments based on real income; however, this is rarely the case. Offering the
nominal amount of money in the short-term bargains reigns supreme as people
don’t make real money adjustments.
Finally, Akerlof and Shiller refer to story-telling or narrativity, which is
the clever and skillful packaging of bundles of emotions into plots with some
twists that capture people’s imaginations and believable explanations of events,
both in the past but more importantly about what will happen in the future.30
Regression equations are the stock and trade of economists, but they make lousy
stories. In order to move people’s emotions, they need a more compelling tale
with elements of the previous discussion – confidence, fairness, immorality, and
illusion – in order to motivate them will some sort of orchestrated effervescence
of emotions. Needless to say, this is not in the stock and trade of econometrics.
Akerlof and Shiller do not plum the depth of human emotion, but as economists
they uniquely point to many emotions that are directly involved in market
processes. But their turn to ‘animal spirits’ only came about in the face of a major
crisis and they are still ignored by most neo-classical economists.31
Beyond emotions and tradition, Weber did have an overriding concern
with one type of rationality that promotes maximization and also human suffering
-- bureaucracy, the rise of capitalism, and even science with new discoveries.
Doesn’t this mean that the machine of rationality is taking over society? While
28

Robert J. Schiller, Irrational Exuberance (2010), 26-30.
George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits (2010), 41.
30
Ibid., 51-58.
31
The exception to the overlooking of values is the more cognitively focused behavioral
economics that focuses especially on cognitive anchoring, fairness and money illusion (Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000, Kahneman 2013). However, their often clever experiments do not question
markets but rather try to add their accuracy. Nonetheless, they do include some issues related to
emotions.
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Weber was very troubled by this vision of an “iron-cage” of rationality, neoclassical economists should not take heart that Weber is supporting them because
in fact he is criticizing their world view. In order get our humanity back, we have
to rebalance our decision-making to embrace theoretical rationality based on more
fundamental values than unfettered growth, and cultural values of wellfunctioning traditions and positive human emotions. While this may be putting
words in Weber’s mouth, he in effect is saying “neo-classical economist, heal
thyself.”
Amartya Sen and Edward Fischer take Weber’s theory a bit further in
terms of markets. The first step is that economic decisions are not only made
about prices and profits, but they are also made concerning quality of the product
(implying quality of life) and the values that these products tend to create. One
may make economic decisions based on the price of the product, the quality of the
product, and the values or justice that they engender to an increasingly global
community. Fischer argues that the order of these components of decision-making
may be reversed with the values coming first, the quality coming second, and the
prices coming last. This is certainly turning this decision-making process on its
head.
Fischer gives the examples of buying eggs in Germany and fair trade
coffee from Guatemala. In highly industrialized Germany, eggs are graded into
four categories: organic and free range, free-range, cage-free, and caged. To the
human eye, the eggs largely look alike. In Hannover 60% of consumers buy the
organic or free-range eggs at 4 to 5 times the cost, and in Germany as a whole,
30% of people buy the same product. Why would maximizing rational people
spend more on something when the product is not larger or does not particularly
taste any different? The reason is that the decisions are based on values that
indicate that chickens should be treated in a less horrid way than caged birds
given artificial growth hormones. Another reason is that these people belong to
communities (religious, political, or otherwise) that hold each other to social
norms that constrain their actions (social pressures may exist that make one less
respected if they are seen buying caged eggs). A similar logic applies to human
producers. Why would people buy ‘fair trade’ coffee from Guatemala when it
costs 30% to 60% more than free market coffee. A first reason is that they are
expressing values that Guatemalan coffee growers should be able to make a
decent living growing their crops and not be subject to dictates of demand and
supply in a world market. The domestic living-wage movement expresses a
similar concern. A more social reason may be that they support the family and
community values of Guatemalan communities and don’t want to see them
supplanted by profit-seeking corporate values. Emotions and theoretical
rationality are involved with these decisions such as doing the right thing or
seeking solidarity with others.
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This then returns to Karl Polanyi’s discussion of the forms of exchange
that put a little bit more interactional meat on Weber’s decision-making bones.
Polanyi sees labor in social interaction as being based on four principles:
reciprocity, competition, joy of work, and social approbation or social pressure.32
Markets are mostly involved with competition to get the lowest price or highest
quality for the price, but reciprocity, working for craftsmanship, and social
pressure put the transaction into a complex social web where people know each
other and have to respect the ebb and flow of their own ties to others. Much of
Polanyi’s work is based on the anthropological work of Bronislaw Malinowski,
Raymond Firth, and Richard Thurnwald.33 In my own work, I develop this in
terms of restricted exchange between strangers or competitors and generalized
exchange between friends and within families.34 Generalized exchange can be
further put forth as bonding social capital or exchanges that take place for the
benefit of the neighborhood, kin group, or for the community in general.
Exchange theory has developed these concepts even further with experimental
research.35
Economists may argue that this may be a limited market segment of world
production. But beyond reciprocity within families and communities, one finds
that more affluent citizens may make these more moral decisions where values
predominate over profit, and in the advanced industrialized world, there are many
people who can afford to make these decisions. Fischer argues that there are more
of them in Germany than in many other advanced industrialized countries. And
other institutions such as worker representation on corporate boards, works
councils elected by workers within firms, and strong welfare states accompany
these Polanyian type institutions. While economists may argue that people will
not make these decisions if they are poor, what explains affluent investment
bankers in pursuing maximum profits just for their reputation as a player on the
street? Using Polanyi, these chrematistic processes (sometimes called ‘pissing
matches’ in the vernacular) involve people who are affluent and could certainly
afford to consider buying expensive eggs and fair trade coffee. What kind of
rationality keeps them in what often becomes an exploitative game of maximizing
32
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profits for a life style that they hardly need? What kind of culture breeds this kind
of behavior, where in the end, money does not buy happiness but rather simply
increments in a rather dubious reputation.36
But there is another element that may not involve affluence but rather
destruction. The environmental issue of global warming threatens the planet
according to most natural scientists. Can the world restrain the short-term focus of
global capitalism in order to take a long-term agenda to save the planet? The
emotion here is long-term fear rather than feeling good in helping poor people in
another country. Where is the self-correcting market mechanism within capitalism
to counter this problem? Some consumers may make similar decisions to buy
hybrid cars, avoid coal-based energy production, and limit carbon dioxide
production. The issue here is not so much affluence allowing it, but is rather the
long-term survival of society. Jared Diamond in his book on how societies decide
to collapse or adapt made the argument that Norse farmers who colonized
Greenland produced and ate dairy cattle until they could not produce enough, but
refused to catch and eat the abundant fish in the nearby ocean.37 Looking at this
from afar we might ridicule the beef maximizing culture as short-sighted and even
ridiculous. Will people in the future look at our high energy consuming culture
based on oil and coal in the same way?
Bargaining Power Mechanisms in Markets:
Going back to the world of competing strangers, market theory needs a more
ubiquitous mechanism for market behavior that does not have to rely on economic
equilibrium. This can be found in a micro-interactionist theory called social
exchange theory. Karen Cook and Eric Rice (2001: 715) indicate that a “marriage
of exchange theory and economic sociology” is “promising.” This approach
establishes a basic market mechanism that shows that nearly all market
transactions are negotiated in terms of unequal power. Social exchange theory is a
modified product of rational choice theory. It was started with George Homans
and Peter Blau, but found its most important developments with Richard Emerson
and Karen Cook.38 They developed the basic idea that power is based on
Economics often starts off from the assumption of scarcity. Because scarcity is always present,
people will maximize their profits and minimize their costs. However, the issue of affluence
questions this basic assumption of scarcity.
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dependence.
More specifically the power of Albert is based on Jim’s dependence on
Albert, and Jim’s power is based on Albert’s dependence on Jim. And the overall
power relationship can be based on comparing these two dependencies.
Dependence itself is based on having fewer alternatives than other people, and
these alternatives are based on the probability of success in obtaining resources
that you value. While they use many equations to express this, the more or less
bottom line is that a powerful person has more valued alternatives of a relatively
high probability of success than a less powerful person who has fewer alternatives
and lower probabilities of success. This gets elaborated with formal equations:
1. PAlbert = 1 / Alternatives of Jim
2. PJim = 1 / Alternatives of Albert
3. Net Power of Albert = PAlbert - PJim
The inequality of bargaining power is laid out in figure 1 where everyone does not
have the same power. High income people have many more alternatives than low
income people because they control more resources.39 This theory is made more
realistic with the application of expected value to the relationship. Alternatives
have a probability of occurring and they have a certain outcome in terms of
value.40 So any alternative can be evaluated by multiplying the probability of its
occurrence times the value of the outcome (i.e., an expected value). So one’s
overall power situation is the sum of their alternatives weighted by their
probability and values. It is clear that higher income people have higher
probabilities of gaining higher value outcomes than lower income people.
This micro-logic was pushed further into the macro-world by Samuel
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Bacharach and Edward Lawler in two books about bargaining in organizations
and nation-states.41 A simple example might be that a broker who has many
houses to sell has more alternatives than a buyer who may have looked at only a
few houses. Dependence may be further exacerbated by the buyer “has to have
this house” since it is close to relatives, a local park, or their work. The most
frequent example is the unfair bargaining position of an individual employee
seeking work from a large corporation. Under conditions of high unemployment
the worker has little power since the firm has so many alternatives.
This type of theory is then plugged into every market exchange with the
recognition that both restricted and generalized exchanges may occur (as
discussed in the previous section). The power relationships are then as follows for
high income person and a low income person.
Σ Alternatives high (Phigh * Vhigh) > Σ Alternatives low (Plow *
Vlow)
In figure 2, these bargaining power relationships are diagrammed. Given that the
alternatives’ values and probabilities are equal, the high income person has twice
as much bargaining power than the low income person. In figure 2, the situation
of an employer who has many choices and an employee who has only one is
portrayed.
Σ Alternativesc (Pc * Vc) > Σ Alternativese (Pe * Ve)
In this case, the corporation (c) has five times the bargaining power of the
employee (e) given that the alternatives are of equal value. And when more
information is available on the alternatives’ probability and value, the bargaining
power differences are even more accurate.42
While there may be a few market exchanges where bargaining power is
equal, the vast majority of exchanges are conducted between the powerful and the
less powerful and the very weak.43 For example, consider the mortgage officers
41
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(who themselves are representing major investment and commercial banking
interests) offer a low income couple entry into the housing market that they would
not otherwise be able to afford (a frequent occurrence before the collapse of the
mortgage market and the 2008 Great Recession). The mortgage officer has many
alternatives to using that money represented by the loan, but the low income
couple now has a chance to buy a house which previously was only a dream.
Their loan with relatively low payments comes with a balloon payment after 3 to
5 years. Clearly, the mortgage banker has more bargaining power in this situation.
There are two elements involved, one of which some economists have dealt with,
and another that they have not. The first is information asymmetry. Joseph
Stiglitz, George Ackerlof and others have worked on this principle which
basically indicates that the bank knows more about this loan and the couple’s
ability to pay than the low income couple knows. More specifically they know
that it will be very difficult for the couple to make the balloon payment 3 or 5
years. If the couple cannot make the payment, the bank takes back the house and
sells it to someone else, and the young couple loses what they have paid into the
house. But the second part of the bargaining mechanism is that the couple have
few alternatives of any value, and the mortgage banker has many (at least until the
housing market collapses on the widespread use of these kinds of predatory
practices).
The final step in this part of establishing a social mechanism of markets is
the replacement of marginal utility with bargaining power in each market
transaction. Marginal utility states that economic incentives to invest are ruled by
the additional increment of exchange value (i.e., profits but it can also be revenue)
that one may obtain by engaging in a transaction. Thus, when these increments of
marginal utility are high enough, investment is encouraged, and when they are
low or negative, investment is withdrawn. However, this theory is a little too
simple. It is basically establishing that a decider has a need, much like
functionalist theory. It tells you very little about the terms of the exchange. One
could argue that the extent of the marginal utility influences ones desire to stay in
the transaction and gain more in the bargain, but that would directly fly in the face
of low income couple’s rather suboptimal bargains. Poor people do not get more
in their bargains (see the “poor pay more” literature on inner city food stores).
One could reverse the relationship and say that the more marginal utility that you
place on a particular bargain, the weaker your bargaining position. However, this
plays into a social dependence theory of bargaining power, a theory that marginal
utility seeks to avoid. The marginalists see the automatic balancing of marginal
utilities in a market as a rather smooth process, not one laden by dependencies
and power relationships. However, the social bargaining power approach places
the unequal bargaining power of the two parties at center stage as a replacement
for the marginalist’s mechanism for market functioning. Thus, power dependency
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constitutes a clear market mechanism of exchange at the micro-level.
Market Failure and Economic Crisis
At this point, I would like to return to Marx and others to discuss market failure.
Within the economics literature, market failure has a very specific meaning. It
refers to areas of life where markets do not work, and governments or other
cooperative civil society organizations should step in to provide goods and
services. In a sense, the market does not solve collective action problems, and the
state or a civil societal community needs to step up and provide the collective
good (e.g., roads, sewage systems, water supply, and even social welfare
payments for those who are more or less discarded by the market). But outside
economics, market failure most often refers to where the market is supposed to be
doing its job, especially financial markets. Major recessions and depressions often
connected to the banking and stock trading systems throw thousands and even
sometimes millions of people out of work, bankrupt various corporations and
governments, and cause a great deal of social havoc and suffering. This is the
market failure that most non-economists are concerned about.
Marx has had the harshest criticism of the capitalist market system. He
said it as prone to failure as the business cycle deepens and crisis leads to great
suffering along with exploitation. There are two major ways that Marx explains
crisis. One is through the lower and lower wage payments that firms provide
when competing in cutthroat markets.44 As workers receive lower wages, they
cannot buy the products that they need and buy the goods that keep the capitalist
system growing. Marx then tied this immiseration thesis with a theory of the
declining rate of profit, which is much more oriented toward firms.45 This decline
affects how organizations act and investors put their money, which are also
declining since they get dividends and other revenue from stock purchases or
lending money to firms. Marx was not totally clear about the declining rate of
profit in the third volume of capital because he referred to it as “a tendency”
rather than a clearly stated law. However, whatever the source, Marxian theory
has always maintained that there is a strong sense of crisis attached to the
capitalist system and that its most important parts emerge from the exploitation of
workers.
While crisis theories are quite useful when there is actually a crisis, when
times are good for the economy, crisis theory fades from view. Despite and also
because of exploitation, capitalist economies have had sustained periods of
economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter has often linked this to the entrepreneurial
approach of ‘creative destruction’ whereby industries grow through their own life
44
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cycle, and as they decline, new industries based on recently developed
technologies take their place.46 Consequently, although there is decline, it is
always superseded by the growth of new products, technologies and firms
employing large number of workers. Crises come about when there is a
technological lull in producing new industries or when consumers or investors are
hesitant to embrace new technologies.47 This leads to a more or less standard
theory of business cycles from which recovery is lamentably slow but somewhat
inevitable.48
However, there are recessions and depressions that are more intense than
others. They are so slow that the short-run business cycle seems to move into a
long-run decline. And Keynes is famous for his dictum that “in the long-run, we
are all dead.” This is where Hyman Minsky’s theory is particularly useful. He
puts forward three stages or types of financing that affect stock markets,
investment banks, and other investment venues: hedge, speculative and Ponzi
finance.49 In hedge financing, investors are relatively conservative. They expect
the cash flow from their loans or investments to be “more than sufficient” to meet
their commitments in the future. In other words, prudent investment is hedged by
dependable firms using their money and repaying it within an expected period of
time. In speculative-financing, banks expect cash receipts to be less than their
commitments in the static short-term, but they expect additional growth
opportunities that will increase the value of their investments and their revenues
in the dynamic medium-term. So compared to hedge-financing, they are taking a
risk that economic growth will occur to pay for the somewhat risky bets they are
taking. In Ponzi-financing stage, banks and financiers make investments where
not only is the return of interest or repayments rather insecure, but their own
investments are borrowed to make those loans. In a sense, they are taking a
double risk. This process can fit well with a the political business cycle theory of
Michaƚ Kalecki where ruling politicians can reinforce these processes or initiate
them through inflationary spending.50
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Cycles come about in moving from hedge financing to the other two
stages. The banks or financiers increasingly expect to make a killing in a major
growth industry. They are driven to these other two stages by three factors. First,
hedge financing is generating low but steady profits. But they see other firms
making more money. The success of others makes the hedge-fund firms’ low
profits look like failure. As a result, investors may move from the hedge-fund
bank to riskier banks, causing a diminution in capital of the hedge-fund firm.
Second, these next steps are based on expectations of large profits, and a certain
amount of greed enters into the picture as their investors are always looking for
higher returns. These expectations of profits double back to reinforce the
optimism that future transactions are a sure thing to score future profits. And
third, once they enter the speculative stage and are not covering debts, they need
to “double down” with more risk believing that a bigger gain in Ponzi finance will
bail them out of their debt-burdened predicament.
While the business cycle has ups and downs with product and industrial
life cycles, financial cycles operate with their own logic to push financiers to
more risky alternatives and sometimes disastrous consequences. Mainstream
economic thought on business cycles include growth spurts (as with automobiles
or computers) and a boom may last for a decade rather than the usual 3 or 4 years.
Speculative and Ponzi financing will take off during these periods and it may be
difficult to differentiate between legitimate growth, delusional expectations, and
outright frauds (e.g., Bernard Madoff massive investment pyramid scheme). Once
a sufficient percentage of banks and investors have reached the Ponzi finance
stage, it is only a matter of time before the bubble bursts and the economy
tumbles down in the stock market and then affecting nearly all firms and workers.
Massive government intervention is then necessary to reflate the economy and get
the labor force back to work. These periods are especially painful. Minsky’s point
is that because of the pressures to move to more profits either through greed or
through rear guard actions to keep ones investors in the face of other apparent
profit makers, the cycle is largely inevitable. The severity of cycles will vary, but
they will continue to appear. One of the major difficulties is to differentiate
between “legitimate high growth in the future” and “bubbles” that are
manufactured by what Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan referred to as
“irrational exuberance,” which he warned about but then became subject to
himself. A major problem of these latter two stages is that fraud or unwarranted
exuberance need not be an actual pyramid scheme, but may simply be
encouraging investors to pursue a good investment that everyone else will get in
on. In the 2008 great recession it involved mortgage bankers encouraging
customers with little bargaining power to take loans with balloon payments they
regulation of markets.
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could never make. It involved investment banks and brokers encouraging clients
to buy stocks or funds that they knew were “dogs” destined to decline.
After such crises, there is a call for government or industry regulation.
This tends to be short-lived in most cases, though the Glass-Steagal Act remained
in effect from the 1930s to the 1990s. In the current crisis, the Dodd-Frank Law to
curtail these problematic financial misdeeds garners immediate attention, but as
time passes conservative governments backed by the financial industry whittle
away at regulation with the argument that they are preventing economic growth, a
goal that all politicians want in one way or another. As Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff say in their masterful study of eight centuries of major crises:
“This time it is different.” 51 There are plenty of investors, firms, and banks that
argue that we are on the edge of a major boom and that only a fool would not
jump in. And so in actuality, the fools jump.
Conclusion
This article makes no claim about ranking or synthesizing these theories. These
are the five main challenges to market rationality and efficiency that now exist in
the social and behavioral sciences. Various parts of all of them could be
synthesized into a larger theory, but that work remains to be done in future work.
In this conclusion, I will indicate how these theories are compatible or
contradictory, and what possibilities may exist about synthesizing them into a
more comprehensive theory.
These challenges are pitched at different levels. Polanyi points to the state
as the constructor and regulator of markets that keep the system going. Fligstein
points to the role of firms in using a ‘conception of control’ to come up with new
ways of making markets function given the constraints that the state may impose.
Weber, cultural sociologists, and economic anthropologists point to how decisionmaking mechanisms may work together to combine rationality, tradition and
emotions into different types of value configurations that may rank quality, justice
and price in different sorts of ways. The bargaining power theory points to the
precise inequalities that may be present in market relationships operating under
competitive rationalities so that inequality is always created and recreated rather
than whisked away by claims of efficiency. And with crises, Marx, Schumpeter,
and Minsky point to the inevitability and actual mechanisms of predictable
economic conflagrations. Polanyi and Marx are more macro than Schumpeter and
Minsky on crisis. Fligstein operates more at the mezzo-level in his approach. And
the cultural decision-making and bargaining theories point to a micro-approach
that pinpoints mechanisms of inequality, but also of cultural constructions of
51
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traditions that may balance efficiency and justice, or not.
Each one of these challenges poses different sorts of power issues.52 First,
labor markets mitigate against workers when there are few alternatives as during
high unemployment. This is ‘marketplace bargaining power’ based on tight labor
markets. Second, labor’s position in the production process can give workers
‘workplace bargaining power’ with leverage over capitalists, resulting in the
power to strike and raise wages or improve working conditions. Labor law has a
lot to do with strengthening or weakening this power. Third, ‘associational power’
in terms of unions (UAW) or interest groups (NOW or the NAACP) can lead to
coalitions and growing political power. And fourth, ‘informational power’ can
come from open access to information and the evening of information (lessening
of asymmetrical information) in bargaining situations. State regulatory power can
have a lot to do with the power of corporations and other private firms. Future
work would need to flesh out these powers in terms of policy, as this paper has
focused on the theoretical challenges currently being faced by unruly markets.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to synthesize this into a more general
theory. But social scientists are working in the fields of economic and cultural
sociology, and economic anthropology to create a more complete theory of what
we might call “social markets” for the future. The policy implications of this
approach will definitely challenge the oft claimed queen of the social sciences –
neo-classical economics.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Bargaining Power between High and Low Income Persons
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Note: Each alternative is evaluated according to its probability of success (Prob)
and the value of the alternative (value).
Figure 2: Bargaining Power between a Corporation and a Worker
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